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1954] RECENT DECISIONS 611 
Evm:ENCE-lli3STRIC'l'IVB lN:rmu>RBTATION OF STATUTB lNTENDBD TO LmBR-
ALIZB .AmvnssroN .oi: STATB:MENTS BY PERSONS SINCE DECEASED-Defendant, 
while driving an automobile, struck the plaintiff's decedent, a pedestrian, 
causing injuries which ultimately resulted in her death. An action was 
brought by the plaintiff as administrator of the estate under a statute giving 
the right to recover for wrongful death.1 It was contended that statements made 
by the deceased to members of her family in the hospital one to two weeks 
after the injury, such as ''If she had stayed on her own side of the road, she'd 
never hit me," were admissible under a South Dakota statute purporting to 
1 S.D. Code Supp. (1952) §37.2201 et seq. 
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make statements of deceased persons receivable in actions by or against their 
representatives.2 The trial court excluded the evidence and entered judgment 
for the defendant. On appeal, helcl, affirmed. The evidence was properly 
excluded since the statute pertaining to admissibility of statements of deceased 
persons does not apply to a wrongful death action, but is limited to actions 
actually involving the decedent's estate. Larimore 'li'. Dobbs, (S. D. 1953) 
57 N.W. (2d) 750. 
At common law, all parties and persons interested in the outcome of 
litigation were held incompetent to testify.3 This disqualification of interested 
persons as witnesses was removed by statute throughout the United States, 
but an exception was carved out of the old incompetency and allowed to 
remain in the form of enactments called dead man statutes, which excluded 
the testimony of the survivor of a transaction with a decedent, when offered 
against the estate.4 These dead man statutes have been criticized and con-
demned by courts and writers as being of doubtful e:,-,..Jrediency, 5 and as tending 
to obstruct honest claims as often as they defeat unjust claims while fomenting 
an enormous amount of litigation in their interpretation. 6 Thus, it has come 
to be regarded as a sound rule of construction that such statutes should not be 
extended beyond their letter when the effect of such extension will be to add 
to the list of those whom the act renders incompetent as witnesses.7 The 
statute under which the principal case arose supersedes a dead man statute 
and embodies a statutory exception to the hearsay rule providing for admission 
of certain statements of the deceased as well as the testimony of the survivor.8 
It is identical to the statute recommended by the Committee of the Common-
2 S.D. Code (1939) §36.0104 provides: "In actions, suits, or proceedings by or against 
the representatives of deceased persons including proceedings for the probate of wills, any 
statement of the deceased whether oral or written shall not be excluded as hearsay, provided 
that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made by decedent, and 
that it was in good faith and on decedent's personal knowledge." 
s 2 W1GMORE, EvmBNCJl, 3d ed., §575 (1940). 
4 Id., §578; 5 JoNBs, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., §2222 (1926). 
5St. John v. LoHand, 5 N.D. 140 at 143, 64 N.W. 930 (1895), states: "Statutes 
which exclude testimony on this ground are of doubtful expediency. There are more 
honest claims defeated by them by destroying the evidence to prove such claim than there 
would be -fictitious claims established if all such enactments were swept away, and all 
persons rendered competent ,vitnesses." Accord, McKay v. Brink, 65 S.D. 472, 275 N.W. 
72 (1937). 
6 "As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded interest-qualifica-
tion is deplorable in every 1espect; for it is based on a fallacious and exploded principle, it 
leads to as much or more false decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession 
with a profuse mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words." 2 WIG-
:r.roRE, EVIDBNCJl, 3d ed., §578, p. 697 (1940). See also Ladd, "Admission of Evidence 
Against Estates of Deceased Persons," 19 IowA L. R:sv. 521 (1934). 
7 St. John v. Lofland, note 5 supra; Reinschmidt v. Hirsch, 65 S.D. 498, 275 N.W. 
356 (1937). The latter decision was decided under S.D. Rev. Code (1919) §2717 and 
was cited in the principal case, curiously enough, in support of an effort to limit the liberal 
language of the later S.D. Code (1939) §36.0104. 
SNote 2 supra. 
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wealth Fund,9 approved by the American Bar Association,10 and urged by 
eminent writers on evidence as representing the enlightened policy of the 
future.11 It is suggested that this type of statute may serve to eliminate much 
of the unjustness and some of the snarls of confficting authority which have 
arisen as a result of the dead man statutes.12 While it is generally held that 
statutes removing the incompetency of survivors should be liberally construed 
to e,,,'tend rather than restrict the intended relief and to effectuate their corrective 
purpose,13 the court in the principal case limits and narrows the clear remedial 
language by means of somewhat strained reasoning. This result is reached 
by reliance on cases which hold that the term "representatives" as used in 
statutes relating to admissibility of declarations of deceased persons does not 
include a representative who is merely a formal party for maintenance of a 
wrongful death action, but only those who sue or defend in the interest of 
the estate.14 The court concludes that since a wrongful death recovery in 
South Dakota is not for the benefit of the estate, the statute cannot apply in 
such actions.lli But these cases were decided under the often criticized dead 
man statutes, diametrically opposed in policy and theory to the statute before 
the South Dakota court, and the decisions limited the scope of the statutory 
restrictions in order to enlarge the competency of witnesses and make more 
testimony admissible. It would appear that such construction is clearly not 
appropriate to the liberal provisions which this court considered. The court 
also cited Connecticut decisions in support of its position,16 since this state has 
a similar provision for admitting any relevant extant vvritings or declarations 
of the deceased party as well as the testimony of the survivor.17 However, 
while holding that to come within the purview of the statutory term "repre-
sentative'' one must take some portion of the estate, the Connecticut court 
nevertheless has indicated that its statute is applicable to an action brought 
by the administrator of the deceased to recover damages for injuries resulting 
in death.18 Whether such a statute is applicable in an action for wrongful 
o This committee was composed of a group of distinguished scholars: Morgan, Chafee, 
Gifford, Hinton, Hough, Johnston, Sunderland, and Wigmore. Their proposals were 
embodied in the report, T:tm I.Aw OF EVIDENCE, SoME PROPOSAI.s FOR ITS REFoID\t (1927). 
10 Proposal No. 1, 63 A.B.A. REP. 597 (1938). 
11 Ladd, ''The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legislative 
Proposal," 26 IowA L. REv. 207 (1941); 2 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§578a, 1576 
(1940). 
12 5 JoNEs, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., §2225 (1926). 
13 Re Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934); Walter v. Sperry, 86 Conn. 474, 
85 A. 739 (1913). See 96 A.L.R. 686 (1935). 
14 Riley v. Lukens Dredging & Contracting Corp., (D.C. Md. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 144; 
Reinschmidt v. Hirsch, note 7 supra. 
lG Principal case at 751. 
16 Lockwood v. Lockwood, 56 Conn. 106, 14 A. 293 (1887); Doolan v. Heiser, 89 
Conn. 321, 94 A. 354 (1915). 
17 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7895. 
18 KoskofE v. Goldman, 86 Conn. 415, 85 A. 588 (1912); Dupre v. Atlantic Relining 
Co., 98 Conn. 646, 120 A. 288 (1923). 
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death might well depend upon the capacity in which an executor or admin-
istrator acts in bringing the suit,19 but the spirit of this liberal enactment would 
seem to deny such a distinction. 
Richard W. Young 
19 20 &r.. Jm., Evidence §615 (1939). 
